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Introduction
What is a PAKE
• Password Authenticated Key-Exchange protocol.
• Goal: Establishment of strong cryptographic session keys from
low entropy secrets.
• Attacks should be limited to online dictionary attacks only.
• A may test at most one password per session during an
active attack.
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PAKEs Application I
Build secure channels relying only on shared passwords.
• No need of PKI.
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PAKEs Application II
Login scenarios while intrinsically protecting the user’s
password.
• In 2018, 49% of phishing attacks where performed in https
web pages (marked as secure by the browser).
• PAKEs prevent the compromise of the user’s password.
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Motivation and Research Objectives
Our aim is to facilitate the adoption of PAKEs in real-world
applications.
1. Examine whether the simulation-based and
indistinguishability-based security notions for PAKEs are
equivalent.
2. Investigate whether the SPAKE2 protocol provably satisﬁes some
meaningful notion of forward secrecy.
3. Investigate the relevance of tight security reductions for PAKE
protocols.
We consider the computational-complexity approach in our analysis.
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Relation between SIM-based and
IND-based security models
Security Models for PAKEs
IND-based
1. Find then Guess (IND-FtG)
[BPR00]
2. Real or Random (IND-RoR)
[AFP05]
SIM-based
• Boyko Mackenzie and Patel
(SIM-BMP) [BMP00]
• Universally Composable
PAKEs (UC) [CHKM05]
6
Security Models for PAKEs
IND-RoR SIM-BMP
IND-FtG SIM-UC
Fig. 1: Known relations between PAKE security deﬁnitions.
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Security Models for PAKEs
IND-RoR SIM-BMP
IND-FtG SIM-UC
?
Fig. 2: Known relations between PAKE security deﬁnitions.
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Real or Random Security Model (IND-RoR)
• Security deﬁned by a game played CH and A.
• initUser (U)
• initInstance (U, i, pid)
• Send (U, i,m)
• Execute (U, i,U′, i′)
• Corrupt (U)
• Test (U, i)
• if b = 1 real session key.
• if b = 0 random string.
Deﬁnition
Protocol P satisﬁes RoR security if ∀ PPT A:
AdvRoRP (A) ≤ k|D| + negl(λ)
k: number of active instances
D: password dictionary 9
Simulation-based Security Model (SIM-BMP) I
Real World
• Real execution of the
protocol.
• The adversary controls the
network.
RW adv. is given access to the
following queries:
• initUser (U).
• initInstance (U, i, pid).
• Send (U, i,m).
• Corrupt(U)
• Application (f,U, i).
Transcript: RW(B)
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Simulation-based Security Model (SIM-BMP) II
Ideal World
• Deﬁnes the ideal
functionality for a PAKE.
• Secure by deﬁnition.
IW adv. (or simulator) is given
access to the following queries:
• initUser (U).
• initInstance (U, i, pid).
• Abort user instance (U, i).
• Test instance password (U, i, pi′).
• Start session (U, i).
• Application (f,U, i).
• Implementation.
Transcript: IW(B∗)
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Simulation-based Security Model (SIM-BMP) III
Deﬁnition
Protocol P is SIM-BMP secure if:
∀B ∃B∗ s.t. RW(B) ≈c IW(B∗)
No assumption is made about the distribution of passwords.
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SIM-BMP→ IND-RoR I
Theorem (SIM-BMP→ IND-RoR)
If protocol P satisﬁes SIM-BMP security, then P also
satisﬁes IND-RoR security.
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SIM-BMP→ IND-RoR II
• We construct B from A.
• The output is RW(B).
By SIM-BMP security deﬁnition:
∀B ∃B∗ s.t. RW(B) ≈c IW(B∗)
• Build a distinguisher D(trx).
1 ← D(·) if real-world trx.
0 ← D(·) if ideal-world trx.
AdvRoRP (A) ≤
k
|D| + negl(λ)
· · · then P is IND-RoR secure.
B,B∗ are real-world and ideal-world adv. in SIM-BMP.
A is the adv. in RoR.
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IND-RoR vs SIM-BMP
IND-RoR SIM-BMP
IND-FtG SIM-UC
?
Fig. 3: Could not prove by contradiction the implication.
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SIM Security: Online Dictionary Attacks
SIM-BMP
1. Incorporate in the IW, the
non-negligible probability of an
adversary guessing the password.
• test instance password
(U, i, pi′).
P is SIM-BMP secure if ∀D:
∀B ∃B∗ s.t. RW(B) ≈c IW(B∗)
SIM-BMP’
2. Do not incorporate in the IW the
non-negligible probability of
guessing the password.
• Relax the indistinguishability
requirement.
P is SIM-BMP’ secure if ∀D:
∀B ∃B∗ s.t. RW(B) k/|D|≈ IW(B∗)
k: number of active instances
D: password dictionary
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SIM-BMP’ Security Model
Deﬁnition
Protocol P is SIM-BMP’ secure if:
∀B ∃B∗ s.t. RW(B) k/|D|≈ IW(B∗)
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SIM-BMP’ Security Model II
Theorem (SIM-BMP’→ IND-RoR)
If protocol P satisﬁes SIM-BMP’ security, then P also satisﬁes
IND-RoR security.
Theorem (IND-RoR→ SIM-BMP’)
If protocol P satisﬁes IND-RoR security, then P also satisﬁes
SIM-BMP’ security.
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IND vs SIM Comparison Results
Our results (in blue) are summarized in the following diagram:
Without Forward Secrecy With Forward Secrecy
SIM-BMP′ FS-SIM-BMP′
IND-RoR SIM-BMP FS-IND-RoR FS-SIM-BMP
IND-FtG SIM-UC
Fig. 4: Relation between PAKE security deﬁnitions.
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Forward Secrecy for SPAKE2
SPAKE2
• PAKE protocol by Abdalla and Pointcheval (CT-RSA 2005).
• One round protocol.
• Currently in the process of standardization by the IEFT.
• Proven secure in the IND-FtG security model (BPR).
... but without forward secrecy.
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SPAKE2 - Description
Client C Server S
Public: M,N ∈ G; Secret: pi ∈ Zq
x $←− Zq, X := gx y $←− Zq, Y := gy
X∗ := X ·Mpi Y∗ = Y · Npi
X∗
Y∗
σ := ( Y
∗
Npi )
x σ := ( X
∗
Mpi )
y
sk := H(C, S, X∗, Y∗, σ, pi) sk := H(C, S, X∗, Y∗, σ, pi)
Fig. 5: SPAKE2 protocol.
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Forward Secrecy
“It ensures the protection of session keys even if the long-term
secret of the participants gets later compromised” [DOW92].
• Weak Forward Secrecy (wFS).
Session keys generated without the active intervention of
A, should remain secret to A, regardless any Corrupt
query.
• Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).
Session keys established before any Corrupt (U) query
should remain secret to the adversary.
• It is difﬁcult to prove PFS for 1-round protocols with only
implicit authentication.
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Perfect vs week Forward Secrecy
Fig. 6: Sessions protected with PFS. Fig. 7: Sessions protected with wFS.
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Fig. 6: Sessions protected with PFS. Fig. 7: Sessions protected with wFS.
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SPAKE2 - Problematic Scenario
Adv. A(C) Server S
x $←− Zq, X := gx y $←− Zq, Y := gy
X∗ := X ·Mpi1 X∗ Y∗ = Y · Npic
σ := ( X
∗
Mpic )
y
Y∗ sk := H(C, S, X∗, Y∗, σ, pic)
• An active adversary tries to impersonate C to S.
• Only implicit authentication : Server accepts (and might
use) sk without conﬁrming its intended partner.
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SPAKE2 - Problematic Scenario
Adv. A(C) Server S
x← Zq, X := gx y← Zq, Y := gy
X∗ := X ·Mpi1 X∗ Y∗ = Y · Npic
σ := ( X
∗
Mpic )
y
Y∗ sk := H(C, S, X∗, Y∗, σ, pic)
...
Corrupt (S)
1. Perfect Forward Secrecy.
• sk must be secret to A.
2. Weak Forward Secrecy.
• Does not guarantee the secrecy of sk.
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SPAKE2 - weak Forward Secrecy
Theorem
SPAKE2 is secure in the BPR model with weak Forward Secrecy
under the CDH and CSDH assumptions:
AdvwFS-FtGP (A) ≤
nse
|D| + O
(
(nse + nex)(nse + nex + nro)
q +
nro ·AdvCDHG (BA) + nsenro ·AdvCDHG (BˆA) +
(nro)2 ·AdvCSDHG (B˜A)
)
.
D: password dictionary
nse: number of Send queries
nex: number of Execute queries
nro: number of random oracle queries
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PFS-SPAKE2
• Incorporating key-conﬁrmation codes to SPAKE2 results in
PFS-SPAKE2.
• Explicit mutual authentication.
• Remove one CRS.
• Computationally more efﬁcient (client side).
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PFS-SPAKE2 Description
Public: M ∈ G; Secret: pi ∈ Zq, pi ̸= 0
Client C Server S
x $←− Zq, X := gx
X∗ := X · Mpi C, X∗ y $←− Zq, Y := gy
σ :=
( X∗
Mpi
)y
σ := Yx Y, k k := H1(C, S, X∗, Y, σ, pi)
k ?= H1(C, S, X∗, Y, σ, pi)
k′ := H2(C, S, X∗, Y, σ, pi)
sk := H3(C, S, X∗, Y, σ, pi) k′ k′ ?= H2(C, S, X∗, Y, σ, pi)
sk := H3(C, S, X∗, Y, σ, pi)
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PFS-SPAKE2 - Security
Theorem
PFS-SPAKE2 is secure in the BPR model with Perfect Forward Secrecy
under the CDH assumption:
AdvwFS-FtGP (A) ≤
nse
|D| +O
(
(nse + nex)(nse + nex + nro)
q +
nro ·AdvCDHG (BA) + nsenro ·AdvCDHG (BˆA) +
(nro)2 ·AdvCDHG (B˜A)
)
.
D: password dictionary
nse: number of Send queries
nex: number of Execute queries
nro: number of random oracle queries
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Tight Security Reductions
Tight Reductions
Hard Problem pi
advantage = ϵpi
running time = tpi
Protocol P
advantage = ϵ
running time = t
An adversary running in time t with advantage ϵ give us a
pi-solver running in time tpi with advantage ϵpi .
• The protocol is secure if such solver does not exist.
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Tight Reductions
Hard Problem pi
advantage = ϵpi
running time = tpi
Protocol P
advantage = ϵ
running time = t
The reduction is tight if
ϵ
t = c ·
ϵpi
tpi .
• Preserve strength of hardness assumption.
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Why Tight Reductions?
The reduction is not tight if: ϵ >> ϵpi or tpi >> t.
• ϵ ≤ L · ϵpi , for large L: security degradation factor.
For instance consider:
• Desired security level of 150 bits for the protocol.
• L = 240 degradation factor.
ϵ ≤ L · ϵpi
2−150 = 240 · 2−190
• Then the hardness assumption needs to provide at least
190 bits of security→ larger parameters and less efﬁcient
impl.
31
PAK Protocol
• Boyko, Mackenzie and Patel 2001.
• PAKE protocol with explicit mutual authentication.
• Low computation and communication cost.
• Satisﬁes forward secrecy.
• Currently under consideration by IETF for standardization.
• Patent expired in 2017.
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Initialization
Public: G, g, q; H : {0, 1}∗ → G;
H1, H2, H3 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k ;
Client Server
Secret: pi piS[C] = (H(piC))−1
x $←− Zq , α := gx
γ := H1(pi)
m := α · γ C,m y $←− Zq , µ := gy
γ′ := piS[C]
σ := (m · γ′)y , i.e. σ = DH(α, µ)
k := H2(C, S,m, µ, σ, γ′)
k′′ := H3(C, S,m, µ, σ, γ′)
σ := µx , i.e. σ = DH(α, µ) µ, k sk := H4(C, S,m, µ, σ, γ′)
γ′ := γ−1
abort if k ̸= H2(C, S,m, µ, σ, γ′)
k′ := H3(C, S,m, µ, σ, γ′)
sk := H4(C, S,m, µ, σ, γ′) k
′ abort if k′ ̸= k′′
Fig. 8: PAK protocol.
33
Non-tight Reduction in PAK I
PAK security proof is not tight:
AdvPAKG (A) ≤
nse
|D| +O
(
nse · (nro)2 ·AdvCDHG (BA)
)
We consider realistic parameters:
• G has order q = 2256 → AdvCDHG ≤ 2−128.
• nse ≈ 230: Number of Send queries.
• nro ≈ 263: Number of random oracle queries.
nse · (nro)2 ·AdvCDHG (BA) >> 1 . . . is meaningless.
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Non-tight Reduction in PAK II
• Instantiation over prime order groups.
• Both CDH and DDH are hard.
• Security proof relies on the CDH
assumption and RO model.
• Construct a CDH-solver algorithm:
H(m, µ, · · · , σ1, pi)
H(m, µ, · · · , σ2, pi)
...
H(m, µ, · · · , σro, pi)
How can the simulator
choose the correct σ s.t.
σ = DH
( m
H(pi) , µ
)
· · · possible with a
DDH-oracle.
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Tightly-secure PAK
Our solution:
• Instantiate PAK over Gap Difﬁe-Hellman groups, e.g.
billinear groups.
• Tight reduction from Gap-DH.
Theorem
AdvPAK(A) ≤ nse|D| + 8 · Adv
Gap-DH
G (BA)
More efﬁcient implementations.
• PAK and G provide the same security level w.r.t. the
Gap-DH problem.
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Summary
Summary of our Contributions
• Proved that the original SPAKE2 satisﬁes weak Forward
Secrecy.
• SPAKE2 with key-conﬁrmation codes satisﬁes Perfect
Forward Secrecy.
• Tight security reduction for the PAK protocol.
• The same technique could be applied to other EKE-based
protocols, e.g. PPK, SPAKE2.
• Comparison between SIM-BMP and IND-RoR security
models for PAKEs.
• SIM-BMP −→ IND-RoR.
• SIM-BMP’←→ IND-RoR.
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Q & A
Thanks !!!
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